Theorizing the Judicialization of International Relations by Alter, Karen J. et al.
International Studies Quarterly (2019) 63, 449–463
Theorizing the Judicialization of International Relations
KAREN J . ALTER
Northwestern University; iCourts, University of Copenhagen
EMIL IE M. HAFNER-BURTON
University of California San Diego
AND
LAURENCE R. HELFER
Duke University; iCourts, University of Copenhagen
This article introduces a Thematic Section and theorizes the multiple ways that judicializing international relations shifts
power away from national executives and legislatures toward litigants, judges, arbitrators, and other nonstate decision-makers.
We identify two preconditions for judicialization to occur—(1) delegation to an adjudicatory body charged with applying
designated legal rules, and (2) legal rights-claiming by actors who bring—or threaten to bring—a complaint to one or more
of these bodies. We classify the adjudicatory bodies that do and do not contribute to judicializing international relations,
including but not limited to international courts. We then explain how rights-claiming initiates a process for authoritatively
determining past violations of the law, identifying remedies for those violations, and preventing future violations. Because
judicializing international relations occurs in multiple phases, in multiple locations, and involves multiple actors as decision-
makers, governments often do not control the timing, nature, or extent to which political and policy decisions are adjudicated.
Delegation—and the associated choice of institutional design features—is thus only the first step in a chain of processes that
determine how a diverse array of nonstate actors influence politically consequential decisions.
International relations (IR) are now experiencing what has
become the norm in many domestic systems: the judicial-
ization of politics. International rules have long regulated
a range of important topics—how and when war is waged,
what barriers to imported goods states can impose, which
nation owns islands and rocks in the sea, when and how
borders shift, and how governments treat their own citi-
zens. The extent to which these rules can be challenged
in court, however, and the diversity of actors that can in-
voke and influence adjudication processes and outcomes,
are novel, wide-ranging, and underspecified both theoreti-
cally and empirically.
Judicialization is the process by which courts and judges
increasingly dominate politics and policy-making (Tate
1995, 28).1 At the international level, judicialization—where
it exists—can diminish the sovereignty of states and the au-
tonomy of their leaders. Several recent examples illustrate
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this effect around the world. In Latin America, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights’ rejection of amnesties
for the perpetrators of human rights violations and atroc-
ities has pushed governments in Argentina, Brazil, Peru,
El Salvador, and other countries to prosecute international
crimes without destabilizing domestic political bargains
(Fortes et al. 2017). China’s vociferous opposition to an arbi-
tral ruling rejecting its expansive claims to the South China
Sea may suggest that legal bodies can do little when op-
posed by powerful interests. Yet, commentators have iden-
tified a variety of ways in which the ruling may be a “game
changer” for negotiations between China and its South-
east Asian neighbors and for international maritime poli-
tics more generally (Graham 2016). In the United States,
President Trump continues to attack the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) and North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA), both of which include international ad-
judication mechanisms. The political rhetoric is often ex-
treme, but government advisors have channeled concrete
proposals in ways that are more legally defensible, and some
proposals—like border value-added taxes—are shelved alto-
gether because they would likely trigger WTO adjudication
(Worstall 2017).
These examples—and others explored in this Thematic
Section—illustrate how judicialization creates a “profound
shift in power away from legislatures [and executives]
and toward courts and other legal institutions around the
world.” (Ferejohn 2002, 41) To be sure, this shift does not
mean that officials cannot flout law—whether domestic or
international. Rather, where government actions are subject
to judicial review, the ability to label an act as a legal vi-
olation may mobilize rights-claiming and a turn to courts,
producing outcomes that may be quite different from what
the absence of judicialized politics would otherwise have
engendered.
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While judicialization can, under certain conditions, re-
duce state control over political processes and outcomes,
this result may or may not be normatively desirable. The
intervention of judges and arbitrators can foster neutral
decision-making, help states to send credible signals, and
help to resolve collective problems. Expanding venues for
nonstate actors, such as nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), to influence politics can generate a sense of in-
clusion, fairness, and transparency. Yet, judicialized interna-
tional relations also have potential vices. Judicialization can
lead to politics by other means, privileging well-resourced
and law-savvy actors (Galanter 1974). It can thwart policies
that have popular support and create legitimacy problems
when judges and arbitrators cannot be held accountable
for their actions. Under some conditions, judicialization can
augment (rather than diminish) state power. And precisely
because judicialization limits executive and legislative power
and constrains domestic policies, it may contribute to back-
lashes against international regimes.
Whatever its normative valence, the judicialization of in-
ternational relations has two institutional preconditions.
The first is delegation. Scholars have thus far mainly ana-
lyzed the existence and forms of state delegation to inter-
national courts or arbitral bodies. We focus instead on the
conditions under which adjudicatory institutions can shape
real world political and policy decisions, demonstrating that
treaty-based delegations are but one way to empower adju-
dicators and that states alone do not determine the content
and scope of delegations.
A second, less studied, precondition for judicializing in-
ternational relations is legal rights-claiming. One or more
actors with standing must bring—or threaten to bring—a
complaint to an adjudicatory body. The filing of such suits
initiates a process for authoritatively naming legal violations,
identifying remedies for those violations, and preventing fu-
ture violations. We thus show that delegation alone is insuf-
ficient to explain whether and how adjudication influences
domestic politics and international relations.
This introduction to the Thematic Section defines the
theoretical and empirical elements of judicialization. We be-
gin by identifying the defining features and range of adju-
dicatory institutions—including but not limited to courts—
that contribute to judicializing international relations. We
then theorize the effects of judicialization by focusing on
the legal processes through which the phenomenon occurs,
noting the ways in which those processes empower different
actors and follow a different rhythm and logic than classi-
cal models of power politics and bargaining. Specifically, we
identify four phases of judicialization, classify the key strate-
gies and decision-makers in each phase, and draw upon the
contributions to this Thematic Section to illustrate the op-
eration of particular phases. Our goal is to identify key ques-
tions and issues to better understand the causes, dynamics,
and political consequences of judicialized international re-
lations. We conclude by explaining how the overarching in-
sights of this framework—that states do not fully determine the
content, scope, or impact of delegation or adjudication and that
legal processes can diminish the role of executives and legislatures—
has important implications for the study of international re-
lations and world order.
Judicializing Politics: A Trend (with an End?)
International law has long been relevant to international
relations, even though international enforcement mecha-
nisms are often lacking and international rules are some-
times violated. For example, Isabel Hull (2014) reveals
that international legality concerns factored into British
decision-making during WWI—long before the creation of
most international judicial bodies. Abraham Chayes (1974)
documents how, in the 1960s, when adjudication of US for-
eign policy decisions was an unlikely prospect, international
law factored into the Kennedy Administration’s closed-door
strategic decisions during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Judicial-
ized politics differs from these examples in that govern-
ments anticipate that international law violations will give
rise to external review by an adjudicatory body.
Our investigation is inspired by the observation that the
nature and the extent of judicial involvement in interna-
tional politics grew tremendously following the Cold War.
At the domestic level, there has been a proliferation of
constitutional courts (Stone Sweet 2000; Ginsburg 2008),
which both reflect and shape a growing culture of legal-
ity (Huneeus, Couso, and Sieder 2011), and a global trend
in rights-claiming and legal activism (Epps 1998; Halliday,
Karpik, and Feeley 2007). The willingness of national judges
to adjudicate human rights abuses (Sikkink 2011), to restrict
foreign sovereign immunity (Roht-Arriaza 2005; Verdier and
Voeten 2015), and to claim extraterritorial jurisdiction has
also increased (Raustiala 2009; Putnam 2016). At the in-
ternational level, the number of permanent international
courts has grown (Romano 1999; Alter 2011), as has litiga-
tion before both newer and older international courts and
arbitral bodes (Alter 2014, 103–7).
The nature of state commitments to external legal review
has also changed. States have increasingly accepted compul-
sory jurisdiction (Romano 2007; O’Connell and VanderZee
2014) and access rules that allow nonstate actors to initi-
ate litigation or arbitration (Alter 2014, 81–85). In addi-
tion, international and transnational law are increasingly
linked to emerging networks and institutions, such as na-
tional human rights institutions (NHRIs) that monitor and
promote the implementation of international human rights
standards, and the Financial Action Task Force that aims
to trace and suppress cross-border money laundering and
terrorist financing. Viewed collectively, these changes have
increased the possibility of raising formal complaints about
state and private actor conduct and policies that violate in-
ternational law.
The theoretical roots of judicialized international rela-
tions are grounded in two distinct traditions. First, we build
on the “Legalization and World Politics” special issue of
International Organization (IO) (Goldstein et al. 2000, 386).
That volume’s central claim is that the legal characteristics
of international agreements and institutions vary across is-
sue area and time, and both influences are affected by world
politics (Abbott et al. 2000). Delegation—which we argue is
a necessary but not sufficient condition for judicialization—
is a central theme in that special issue, and two articles ex-
amine how the design of delegation is politically consequen-
tial.2
Second, we embrace Jeffrey Staton and William Moore’s
(2011) suggestion that international relations scholars shed
the classic assumption that domestic politics is hierarchi-
cal while international politics is anarchical, and with it
the corollary presumption that legalized domestic politics
must be fundamentally different from legalized interna-
tional politics. Our framework thus builds on comparative
2Keohane et al. focuses on the difference between delegation where only
states could initiate litigation versus delegation where private actors could seize an
international court. Alter discusses factors that generate cross-national and cross-
issue variation in the invocation and influence of the European Court of Justice
(Keohane, Moravcsik, and Slaughter 2000; Alter 2000). We broaden the types of
institutions examined and theorize the dynamics that delegation generates.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/isq/article-abstract/63/3/449/5554579 by Acq/Serials D
ept-Periodicals user on 28 August 2019
KAREN J . ALTER, EMIL IE M. HAFNER-BURTON, AND LAURENCE R. HELFER 451
judicial politics and comparative law literatures that ana-
lyze the growing contribution of domestic courts and rights-
claiming to judicializing domestic politics.3 Like interna-
tional courts, national supreme and constitutional courts
have no means to compel governments to follow their rul-
ings (Goldsmith and Levinson 2009). They rely instead on
legitimation strategies that create pressure on governments
to respect the rule of law and to adhere to judicial rulings.
Following these literatures, we accept that legal processes—
a feature of all functioning legal systems—have their own
dynamics and that these processes can be politically conse-
quential because social sanctions (including outcasting and
publicly naming policies as illegal) shape state behavior and
because legal violations sometimes also give rise to coercive
sanctions (Hathaway and Shapiro 2011).
Most of the comparative judicialization literature is court-
focused. As the next section explains, in the international
realm a broader array of adjudicatory bodies contribute to
judicializing politics. In addition, these bodies often span in-
stitutions and borders, making it harder for the executive or
legislative branch in any one state to control legal processes
that they oppose.
Although judicialization is a global phenomenon, it is nei-
ther uniform nor static. There are issue areas where judi-
cialization efforts were never tried or failed (Katzenstein
2014; Romano 2014b; Alter, Helfer, and Madsen 2018; de
la Rasilla and Viñuales 2019) and geographic zones where
international judicialization is all but absent (Kahler 2000;
Kingsbury 2011; Romano 2014a; Romano 2019). Moreover,
we are witnessing a period of backlash against these trends.
Political resistance to assertions of legal authority—both do-
mestic and international—is hardly new (Alter 2000, 2018a;
Helfer 2002; Greenhouse and Siegel 2011). But the current
nationalist-populist backlash arguably has a broader reso-
nance and impact than the reactions that preceded it. A
strength of our framework is that it incorporates backlash as
a type of feedback politics and explores its varied outcomes.
The scope conditions we define below allow us to ob-
serve the number and type of adjudicatory bodies, and the
four-phase framework we develop helps to conceptualize
the political dynamics that drive an expansion or decrease
in judicialization. If the conditions for judicializing politics
substantially change, we would expect judicialization to also
change. Ginsburg and Abebe’s (2019) contribution to this
Thematic Section addresses this issue, applying our frame-
work in reverse to theorize the conditions that contribute to
“dejudicialization” (Ginsburg and Abebe 2019).
The contributions to this Thematic Section focus on
specific phases, institutions, and mechanisms. The larger
framework, described below, identifies the conditions that
contribute to judicializing and dejudicializing international
relations.
Scope Conditions for Judicialized Politics
The existence of adjudicatory bodies that can issue author-
itative legal rulings is a necessary condition for politics to
become judicialized. A central contribution of our project
is to define the types of bodies that can produce this result.
We identify four cumulative criteria, summarized in Table 1.
First, the body must decide concrete legal disputes
between contesting parties. Second, the body’s decision-
3Whereas American judicial politics scholars have emphasized understand-
ing judicial behavior, the comparative politics literature focuses on the role of
courts in influencing politics and policy processes. Examples we build on include:
Ferejohn (2002); Epps (1998); Stone Sweet (1992a, 1992b, 2000); Hirschl (2004,
2014); Tate and Vallinder (1995).
Table 1. Four criteria of adjudicatory bodies that can judicialize politics
1. Formal authority to decide concrete legal dispute between
contesting parties
2. Independent decision-makers that apply preexisting rules and
procedures to review facts, evidence, and legal claims
3. Reaches authoritative determinations of violations of law
(binding or nonbinding)
4. Orders or suggests actions to remedy legal violations and prevent
their recurrence
makers must be formally independent, in that they do
not officially represent states and must apply preexisting
rules and procedures to the disputes that arise. Third, ad-
judicators must have the power to authoritatively declare
whether violations of the law have occurred. Fourth, the
body must have the ability to order or at least suggest actions
that the losing party must take to remedy legal violations
and prevent their recurrence. Together, these four criteria
establish decision-making dynamics that differ from politi-
cal processes. Adjudicatory bodies that meet these criteria
can incentivize potential litigants to raise legal arguments,
making their demands for policy change more credible and
specific and generating additional pressures on states and
national decision-makers to change their policies.
Any adjudicatory body that meets these four criteria is
a potential venue for judicializing politics. Since this defi-
nition includes national courts that hear cases with inter-
national law or transborder dimensions, as well as quasi-
judicial bodies that do not issue legally binding rulings,
it substantially broadens the number and range of actors
and institutions that scholars have traditionally recognized
as influencing politically consequential outcomes. The def-
inition also identifies institutions that fall outside of these
criteria—as might occur, for example, if the second element
(independent decision-makers) is compromised—and issue
areas, such as arms control, that are unlikely to be judicial-
ized because no adjudicatory body fulfilling all four criteria
exists.
In what follows, we briefly discuss a variety of these institu-
tions, highlighting the actors that shape the design decisions
that determine whether an institution meets these four cri-
teria. Table 2 categorizes the types of institutions that do and
do not satisfy the four criteria, describes their attributes, and
provides additional examples.
The twenty-four international courts (ICs) now in oper-
ation around the world are the most obvious, and among
the most studied, institutions that fulfill the four criteria.
The decision of states to delegate adjudicatory powers to ICs
brings with it important and consequential design choices,
such as which actors can file complaints, the criteria for
electing or selecting judges, which international law vio-
lations judges can review, and the kinds of remedies they
award.4 These design decisions affect whether and how the
existence of an IC motivates rights-claiming for a particular
issue. For example, if a court lacks compulsory jurisdiction
or can only award limited remedies, this may inhibit whether
the threat of litigation is credible and thus, in turn, whether
actors mobilize to assert legal rights and judicialize the issue.
While states define key elements of an IC’s jurisdiction
and access rules, international judges have themselves ex-
panded their reach by broadly interpreting these rules,
enhancing their remedial powers, and diminishing the
4For studies seeking to explain the design choices for international adjudi-
catory institutions, see McCall Smith (2000); Allee and Elsig (2016); Koremenos
and Betz (2013); Hooghe et al. (2016).
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Table 2. Types of institutions that contribute to judicialized politics
Category Attributes Examples
Adjudicatory bodies
International courts
and tribunals
◦ Created mainly by state delegations in treaties ◦ International Criminal Court
◦ Adjudicate complaints in disputes alleging violations of
international law
◦ International Court of Justice
◦ International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia◦ Issue legally binding rulings and advisory opinions
◦ May indicate remedies for violations ◦ Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization
◦ European Court of Human Rights
◦ East African Court of Justice
National courts ◦ Preexisting judicial institutions within a national legal
system
◦ Adjudicate complaints in disputes alleging violations of
international law, extraterritorial application of
domestic law, or transnational contracts or torts
◦ Issue legally binding rulings
◦ Order remedies for violations
◦ National trial or appellate courts with jurisdiction over
violations of international law or disputes raising
transborder legal issues
◦ Specialized national courts with jurisdiction over
international law or transborder legal issues (e.g., US
Court of International Trade, criminal courts of East
Timor and Kosovo, China’s Belt and Road courts)
International
arbitration
◦ Established by arbitral institutions or ad hoc
◦ Reviews disputes involving violations of international
law or contracts with transborder aspects
◦ Issue legally binding awards
◦ Remedy for violations is usually monetary damages
◦ International Center for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes
◦ Permanent Court of Arbitration
◦ Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre
◦ Ad hoc arbitration under the UN Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Rules
Quasi-judicial bodies ◦ Created by treaties or IOs ◦ UN human rights treaty bodies
◦ May perform both judicial and nonjudicial functions ◦ NAFTA binational panels
◦ For judicial functions, review communications in
disputes alleging violations of international law
◦ Complaint procedures of national human rights
institutions
◦ Issue nonbinding decisions identifying legal violations
◦ May recommend remedies for violations
◦ Implementation Committee of Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer
◦ World Bank inspection panels
◦ Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission
◦ ILO Committee on Freedom of Association
Non-adjudicatory institutions
International political
bodies
◦ Established by treaty or international organization ◦ UN Security Council
◦ Adopt resolutions and decisions applicable to member
states
◦ UN General Assembly
◦ UN Human Rights Council
◦ Council of the European Union
◦ ECOWAS Council of Ministers
International
investigation,
compliance, and
norm-development
institutions
◦ Established by a treaty ◦ International Atomic Energy Agency
◦ Review state party reports
◦ Document patterns of international law violations
◦ Investigate possible violations of international law
◦ Suggest new international legal norms
◦ Conference of the Parties (CoP) of the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora (CITES)
◦ International Law Commission’s preparation of draft
treaties
Mediation and
conciliation bodies
◦ Assist states and private actors in amicably resolving
disputes
◦ WIPO Arbitration & Mediation Center
◦ Singapore International Mediation Centre
◦ Do not issue a decision identifying legal violations ◦ Mediation and conciliation by National Human Rights
Institutions, such as the South African Human Rights
Commission
Administrative review
bodies
◦ Created by a treaty or international organization
◦ Receive and review requests from nonstate actors
◦ Prepare factual findings
◦ Do not identify legal violations
◦ Forward factual findings to other bodies for further
review
◦ Ombudsperson reviews of requests for removal from
lists adopted by UN Security Council Sanctions
Committees
◦ Factual records prepared by the commissions of
NAFTA labor and environment side agreements
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discretion of states and their officials (Weiler 1991; Burley
and Mattli 1993; Alter and Helfer 2010; Huneeus 2013).
For example, Staton and Romero’s contribution to this
Thematic Section considers how judicial choices regarding
remedial orders influence human rights politics in Latin
America. They espouse a model of judicial opinion writing
that connects the clarity of legal rulings to both the infor-
mational challenges judges face and the likely reaction by
national actors (governments and judges) to those rulings.
(Staton and Romero 2019). Larsson and Naurin’s contri-
bution investigates how multidimensional alignments of in-
terests across shifting coalitions of European Union (EU)
members give the Court of Justice of the European Union
interpretative latitude that limits state discretion (Larsson
and Naurin 2019).
Scholars have long studied why states consent to inter-
national judicial review (Moravcsik 1995, 2000; Helfer and
Slaughter 2005; Helfer 2006; Koremenos 2008) and the fac-
tors that influence the design of ICs. What this literature
omits, however, are the diversity of other adjudicatory bod-
ies that can influence international politics, as well as the
different phases in which these bodies shape actor incen-
tives.5
An often overlooked category of adjudicators are national
courts that hear cases involving violations of international
law and transborder legal issues, such as the extraterrito-
rial application of US securities or antitrust statutes, suits
challenging Argentina’s failure to repay its sovereign debt,
or the enforcement of foreign judgments and international
arbitral awards, including against states.6 In countries in
which ratified treaties have automatic domestic effect, na-
tional courts can review international law claims directly.
In others, judges interpret treaties indirectly via implement-
ing legislation and by interpreting domestic statutes consis-
tently with international law (Alford 2006; Szewczyk 2014;
Alter 2018b). The extent to which national courts directly
or indirectly apply international law varies. In this Thematic
Section, Lupu, Verdier, and Versteeg identify two legal tools
that national judges can employ in suits alleging violations
of international human rights law, explain how these tools
influence whether and how those violations are adjudicated,
and test whether the availability of these tools influences the
relationship between treaty ratification and human rights
abuses (Lupu, Verdier, and Versteeg 2019).7
International arbitral bodies are a third type of adju-
dicatory institution. Individuals, corporations, and govern-
ments often prefer private decision-makers to handle legal
disputes, choosing arbitration over judicial venues. Some
treaties make arbitration the default mode of dispute res-
olution. Many bilateral investment treaties, for example,
authorize foreign firms to use international arbitration to
challenge host-state regulations (Büthe and Milner 2014;
Hafner-Burton, Steinert-Threlkeld, and Victor 2016). Invest-
ment arbitration has been increasingly criticized, and Gins-
burg and Abebe identify states that have refused to consent
to investor-state dispute settlement (Ginsburg and Abebe
5The Oxford Handbook of International Adjudication includes international
courts and international arbitration but excludes quasi-judicial bodies (Romano,
Alter, and Shany 2014). In earlier work, Romano provided a helpful list of both
judicial and quasi-judicial international bodies Romano (2011).
6Another example is the domestication of the Rome Statute creating the In-
ternational Criminal Court via national laws that authorize domestic prosecutions
of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity committed at home or
abroad. On the growth of extraterritorial law enforcement, see Raustiala (2009);
Putnam (2016); Bookman (2015, 1108–19).
7 See also Verdier and Versteeg (2015); Bookman (2015).
2019).8 Yet, there is an entire world of international com-
mercial arbitration beyond the realm of investment dis-
putes. Arbitration implicates a set of customizable design
choices selected by the drafters of a treaty or contract, in-
cluding the applicable substantive rules, the “seat” where
proceedings occur, and whether claims are heard by a per-
manent institution or ad hoc panels. These decisions can
also affect whether and where litigation to enforce arbitral
awards occurs.
A fourth category comprises quasi-judicial bodies that are
similar to ICs with one exception—they do not issue legally
binding rulings. For example, the ten United Nations (UN)
human rights treaty bodies review complaints against states
by individuals and NGOs, issue reasoned decisions identi-
fying violations, and recommend remedies (Hafner-Burton
2013). Although nonbinding, these decisions and recom-
mendations can mobilize actors and influence political out-
comes in much the same way as judicial rulings (Kirby 2001;
Hafner-Burton 2012; van Alebeek and Nollkaemper 2012).
A further expansion of quasi-judicial bodies, and of rights-
claiming, has occurred at the domestic level via a network
of National Human Rights Institutions, many of which al-
low individuals to file complaints challenging human rights
violations committed by government agencies or officials
(Linos and Pegram 2016; 2017). Quasi-judicial bodies are
also found in other issue areas of international law, in-
cluding environmental protection, finance, labor, and trade
(Tignino 2016; Chiara 2017).
We emphasize that many familiar international institu-
tions fall outside of this definition or occupy grey areas that
meet some but not all of the four criteria. Table 2 identifies
the key attributes of institutions that do and do not meet our
definition.
Table 2 illustrates several core insights of the judicializa-
tion framework. First, although some adjudicatory bodies
are created by state delegations, many are not. Agreements
to arbitrate, for example, may be the result of private con-
tracting, and national court litigation of international or
transborder suits often occurs without explicit state autho-
rization. Moreover, national courts and arbitral bodies may
also apply domestic law or private contacts, diminishing the
role of executives or legislatures in making decisions rele-
vant to international affairs (Büthe and Mattli 2011).
Second, states do not fully determine the content and
scope of the delegation. While states sometimes augment or
shrink an IC’s jurisdiction (such as by adding the crime of
aggression to the Rome Statute), adjudicatory bodies them-
selves can extend a body’s reach in ways that states neither
intended nor anticipated. For example, many national legal
systems, national courts may apply international law directly
and give it primacy over domestic laws, a broad delegation
that gives these courts considerable discretion (Verdier and
Versteeg 2015). The existence of multiple venues also intro-
duces an iterative dynamic to judicialized politics. Litigants
can shift adjudication across venues, such as from ICs to ar-
bitration, or quasi-judicial bodies to national courts, and lit-
igants and judges may adjust their legal interpretations and
strategies in response to the decisions of other adjudicatory
bodies (Helfer 1999; Hafner-Burton 2005a). This is another
way in which judicialization can diminish state influence.
8Recent debates regarding investment treaty arbitration focus on whether ar-
bitrators privilege the rights of foreign investors over other domestic laws and
policies, such as environmental, public health, and consumer protection. Crit-
ics charge that international arbitration has a chilling effect on domestic policy-
making (Rogers 2013), and their concerns have generated a search for alternative
ways to resolve treaty-based investment disputes (Roberts 2018).
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Table 3. Four phases of judicialized politics
Phase Key actors Strategies
Shadow politics ◦ Litigants with legal standing (states, individuals, firms,
and/or NGOs or interest groups)
◦ Mobilize and frame claims and arguments using legal
language and rights-claiming
◦ Government agencies or officials
◦ Legal and other representatives of these actors
◦ Engage in out-of-court negotiations with the threat of
adjudication in the background
◦ Defensive actions to avoid or improve litigation
outcomes
Adjudication politics ◦ Parties to the dispute
◦ Third-party interveners (e.g., amicus briefs)
◦ Adjudicators (judges, arbitrators, or members of
quasi-judicial bodies)
◦ Litigants select cases, venues, evidence, and legal
arguments
◦ Out-of-court defensive actions to influence adjudicators
and shape adjudication outcomes
◦ Adjudicators choose interpretive rules, determine legal
violations, and indicate potential remedies
Compliance politics ◦ Parties to the dispute ◦ Post-litigation bargaining
◦ Interest groups that favor or oppose compliance
◦ Government agencies or officials asked to comply with
rulings
◦ Public amplification strategies (e.g., media campaigns,
follow-on investigations, copycat suits)
◦ Follow-on enforcement proceedings before national
and international courts
◦ Retaliation and issue linkages if noncompliance persists
Feedback politics ◦ Parties to the dispute ◦ Spillover to issues presenting similar legal violations
◦ Politicians and interest groups that want to expand or
undercut future litigation
◦ Modification of laws and institutions to generalize,
preempt, hinder or weaken future litigation.
◦ Adjudicators in parallel legal bodies (judges,
arbitrators, or members of quasi-judicial bodies)
◦ Backlash: reframing and organizing
countermobilizations against unwanted legal rulings
◦ Dejudicialization: states withdraw from or terminate a
treaty or strip jurisdiction
Third, the criteria and the list of nonjudicial bodies un-
derscores the ways in which adjudication, and the politics
it inspires, can be degraded. States can sometimes reassert
control by tasking political bodies to make factual determi-
nations about violations of international agreements or by
creating specialized review mechanisms to siphon a class of
cases away from existing international review bodies. In ad-
dition, mediation, conciliation, and internal administrative
processes provide alternative approaches to resolve disputes
that may not apply preexisting rules and procedures or may
not be politically independent. These qualities contribute
to the sense that politics, rather than law, shapes these pro-
cesses.
Phases of Judicialized Politics
The two necessary conditions for judicializing international
politics involve delegation to an adjudicatory institution and
legal rights-claiming. The previous section identified the
adjudicatory bodies that fall within our framework. Here,
we focus on rights-claiming and the politics it engenders,
analyzing and illustrating four phases of the process. As
we explain, each phase turns on the decisions of different
key actors, such as adjudicators, winning and losing parties,
potential litigants, interest groups, and collectivities of
states. Executives and legislators cannot determine when
potential litigants engage in legal rights-claiming or how
judges respond to their arguments because these actions, as
well as compliance and feedback politics, can be affected by
multiple factors beyond their control.
The transnational nature of adjudication involving
international law illustrates why the judicialization of in-
ternational relations is a different phenomenon than the
judicialization of domestic politics. At the domestic level,
executive and legislative branches can more easily reclaim
a central, if not exclusive, role in politics. Populist leaders
in Venezuela, Poland, Hungry, Turkey, and Russia have
offered “worst practices” guidebooks on how to reclaim
executive prerogatives (Scheppele 2017). Yet, because the
adjudicatory bodies we discuss exist outside of national legal
orders, these strategies are more difficult to execute. This
is in large part because other states, which are themselves
often pressured by nonstate actors, may reject efforts to
undermine international adjudicatory bodies.
In what follows we focus on politics within each phase. But
we also explain the interactive effects across phases. Table 3
previews the four phases and the key actors, strategies, and
outcomes associated with each phase.
Shadow politics—the first phase—refers to mobilization,
bargaining, negotiations, and responses generated by a
plausible threat of adjudication.9 Such threats empower po-
tential litigants and increase the risks associated with ar-
guably illegal behavior, thereby shaping the incentives of
actors and the voices of those with the law on their side.
The primary actors involved in shadow politics include
government agencies or officials that are potential targets
of lawsuits or arbitration, as well as individuals, interest
groups, firms, and states that assert legal claims, issue for-
mal demands for policy changes, and engage in out-of-court
negotiations.
The strategies that these actors deploy include framing
rights-claims in legal terms, threatening adjudication, iden-
tifying adverse policy consequences linked to law violations,
and offering settlements or adjusting policies to ward off lit-
igation. For example, in Colombia both proponents and op-
ponents of the peace accord between the government and
9The term shadow politics draws inspiration from Mnookin and Kornhauser
(1979).
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the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People’s
Army (FARC) rebels have used litigation threats and court
challenges to bolster their respective arguments, mobilize
supporters, and sway referenda on the peace agreement.
The strategies, terms, and viability of recent peace accords
in Colombia have also been shaped by the prospect of an in-
vestigation by the International Criminal Court (ICC), by lit-
igation threats before the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, and by suits in Colombian courts alleging violations
of international and domestic law (Huneeus 2018).
Another example of shadow politics is unfolding in re-
sponse to President Trump’s decision to withdraw from
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, an agreement
in which Iran committed to the monitored cessation of
its nuclear program in exchange for the five permanent
members of the UN Security Council and the EU lifting
economic sanctions against that country. After exiting the
agreement, the Trump administration reinstated sanctions,
including against non-US companies that do business in or
with Iran. The remaining signatories have pledged to up-
hold the agreement, and US sanctions may run afoul of a
Security Council resolution that gives effect to the Iran nu-
clear deal(Nephew 2018). In addition, Iran has asked the
International Court of Justice to order the United States to
lift the sanctions (van den Berg and Sterling 2018), and the
EU has enacted legislation to bar European companies from
complying with the sanctions(Davenport 2018). As this arti-
cle goes to press, businesses are assessing their legal risks in
anticipation of the restored sanctions and lawyers are mobi-
lizing to advise clients in multiple jurisdictions(BlankRome
2018).
A different aspect of shadow politics involves efforts
to avoid adjudication. Settlement may well be the most
common—yet one of the least studied—manifestation of ju-
dicialized politics (Hafner-Burton, Puig, and Victor 2017).
Such bargaining can be akin to diplomacy and negotiation,
occurring outside of public view (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink
1999, 2013). Judicialized shadow politics is distinctive, how-
ever, in that a third-party adjudicator stands ready to review
claims that the parties cannot resolve themselves. Politics
may become judicialized even if the defendant does not rec-
ognize a legal threat as such; authoritarian leaders, for ex-
ample, often dismiss the relevance of legal claims and ad-
verse court rulings. But where international law violations
can be adjudicated, even recalcitrant defendants often re-
spond with a counterstrategy designed to avoid, derail, or
blunt the impact of adjudication.
Scholars have analyzed bargaining in the shadow of
WTO dispute settlement, where states must engage in
consultations before adjudication commences(Busch and
Reinhardt 2000a, 2000b, 2006; Reinhardt 2001; Steinberg
2002; Davis and Blodgett Bermeo 2009). Studies examine
the politics of consultations, follow-up litigation decisions
(Reinhardt 1999; Davis 2012), how developing countries
seek to strengthen their bargaining position (Shaffer 2003;
Shaffer, Badin, and Rosenberg 2008; Halliday and Shaffer
2015), and which countries are politically advantaged by
threatening to file a WTO suit (Davis and Blodgett Bermeo
2009). There is also an extensive literature on human rights
advocacy strategies, although much of it is focused on polit-
ical pressure rather than on litigation threats.10 For other is-
sue areas, scholars have focused on outcomes that follow ad-
judication rather than those triggered by the threat of suit.
10Literature that does focus on the legal component includes: Sieder,
Schjolden, and Angell (2005); Sikkink (2005); Hafner-Burton (2013); Hafner-
Burton, Victor, and Leveck (2016); Helfer and Voeten (2014); Hafner-Burton and
Tsutsui (2005).
Shadow politics raises important questions for interna-
tional relations scholars: What makes some legal threats
more plausible than others? Which actors seize on oppor-
tunities to press their legal claims out of court? Perhaps
most importantly, when and how is the threat of adjudica-
tion enough to influence the behavior of powerful actors,
such as multinational corporations, heads of state, or mili-
taries?
Adjudication politics—the legal phase of judicialization—
encompasses the factors, strategies, and consequences asso-
ciated with the decision to adjudicate, including which suits
are filed, the selection of venue, the gathering of evidence
and presentation of arguments, and the decisions of judges,
arbitrators, and other adjudicatory bodies. Adjudicators be-
come the dominant actors at this phase, and their indepen-
dence becomes especially relevant (Brinks and Blass 2017).
Because adjudicators determine the outcome of disputes,
states must draw on discursive arguments, legal interpreta-
tions to shape judicial rulings, and out-of-court maneuver-
ing, which may change the facts on the ground. Such argu-
ments, and the interpretations they generate, can produce
politically consequential and enduring outcomes.
Initially, international relations scholars ignored adjudi-
cation politics, arguing that preexisting state interests and
interstate bargaining determines the resolution of legal
disputes (for example, Garrett and Weingast 1993). Our
project interjects the litigation process into this inquiry, ex-
amining how legal proceedings can be shaped by forces that
include the strategic decisions of litigants, the involvement
of third parties, and the decision-making choices of adjudi-
cators.
We are only beginning to understand the reasons motivat-
ing the initial decision to adjudicate. For example, recent
studies of territorial disputes have found that states often
adjudicate territorial claims to surmount festering border
disputes with neighbors, shift blame to external actors, or
secure land rights to attract foreign investment (Simmons
2002, 2005, 2006; Allee and Huth 2006; Huth and Allee
2006). In international trade, states initiate WTO litiga-
tion to show domestic audiences that they are defending
their economic interests (Davis and Blodgett Bermeo 2009;
Davis 2012), to create bargaining chips for future cases,
or to shape jurisprudence in ways that advance their in-
terests (Pelc 2014). For example, states may file suit with
the WTO to create a precedent that applies to other coun-
tries and similar legal issues, but prefer negotiated settle-
ments when seeking a one-off resolution of a dispute (Busch
2007). Private litigants select venues based on factors includ-
ing the types of remedies available, prior application of in-
ternational law, and the likelihood of enforcing judgments
(Helfer 1999; Alter and Vargas 2000; Hafner-Burton 2005b;
Pauwelyn and Salles 2009). These are helpful beginnings,
but we still lack systematic studies of adjudication strategies
by the contesting parties. We also need greater clarity about
whether these insights hold across different types of cases,
litigants, and issue areas, as well as how the parties select
among available venues, including less visible modes of dis-
pute resolution.
Scholars have also examined the factors shaping judicial
decision-making (for example Pauwelyn and Elsig 2012;
Stone Sweet and Brunell 2012; Larsson and Naurin 2016).
In this Thematic Section, Lupu, Verdier, and Versteeg
explore how national judges modulate their decisions
to avoid political backlashes and enhance the extent to
which international human rights law is given direct effect.
Their finding suggests that variations in national judicial
decision-making as well as the substance of the law (e.g., the
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particular human right at stake) can have important conse-
quences for determining whether, how, and to what extent
international rules shape domestic policy (Lupu, Verdier,
and Versteeg 2019). Larsson and Naurin, in their study of
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), venture
beyond traditional behavioral approaches to examine the
relationship between varying state preferences for retaining
sovereignty and distributional concerns about European
social policies. This approach helps to identify when the
CJEU should worry about political backlash and when its
judges have greater political latitude. Their study reveals
the underappreciated point that the preferences of states
and nonstate actors who do not participate in adjudication
also shape IC decision-making (Larsson and Naurin 2019).
Other contributions to this Thematic Section analyze how
decisions made in the adjudication phase are related to
later phases of judicialization. In the context of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, Staton and Romero ex-
plore how the adjudication and compliance phases of ju-
dicialization are deeply intertwined, revealing that judges
strategically attempt to influence state reactions to their rul-
ings through manipulating their choice of language in judi-
cial opinions (Staton and Romero 2019). In a similar vein,
Busch and Pelc use automated text analysis to examine the
incidence of affective terms in WTO Appellate Body rul-
ings. They argue that this international court employs affect-
laden phrases to offer governments normative resources to
persuade domestic audiences to comply with its rulings. The
authors find that affective terminology is more prevalent
for trade disputes that encroach on politically sensitive top-
ics, such as health and environmental standards, and that
it varies systematically according to the legal issue at stake,
suggesting an awareness by adjudicators of the risks of judi-
cializing issue areas traditionally reserved for domestic reg-
ulation (Pelc and Busch 2019).
Compliance politics—the third phase—refers to the strate-
gies and actions of the litigants or other actors who press
for or against adherence to legal rulings. Decisions by gov-
ernments about whether, when, and how to comply with the
law often shift once an IC or other third-party adjudicator
has issued a ruling. By naming a certain policy or action as
a violation, such rulings undercut the legitimacy of the con-
demned action. By specifying what compliance with the law
requires, adjudication narrows the plausible arguments for
maintaining a policy and creates a focal point for pressuring
respondents (often states) to change their behavior.
Pundits often suggest that major policy changes
necessarily—or likely—follow an adverse legal ruling.
Scholars of judicial politics, however, know that the impact
of legal rulings can be nonexistent, indirect, unintended,
delayed, or difficult to discern (Rosenberg 1993). Numer-
ous factors influence how post-litigation compliance politics
unfolds. The key actors in this phase shift back to the
litigants. Immediately following a ruling, losing defendants
have a choice. They may accept the financial or political
costs of continued noncompliance, agree to only symbolic
concessions, or seek more time by creating an inadequate
or feigned implementation response, as Japan did when
it initially sought to define itself out of complying with an
ICJ ruling (Butler-Stroud 2016).11The choice among these
decisions can trigger further litigation in which adjudicators
are asked to declare additional remedies or to moderate the
remedies they previously demanded.
Should the state fall short, a broader set of actors may
mobilize to push for full compliance. States that did not
11 See also Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2004).
participate in the litigation may retaliate, apply preexisting
domestic provision that withdraw benefits (such as aid, mar-
ket access, new agreements or political exchanges) so long
as the violation persists. NGOs can use the violation for mo-
bilization and political leverage (e.g., with legislators and lo-
cal officials). International institutions can factor the viola-
tion into their decision-making. Legal rulings may also be
enforced in different venues, including domestic courts in
countries where assets are held. All of these actions can in-
crease the costs of flouting a ruling.12
As this discussion reveals, compliance politics are much
larger than the question of whether or not a state fol-
lows a particular ruling. This binary question is often far
too simplistic, especially because compliance is often par-
tial (Hawkins and Jacoby 2010). The key analytical inquiry
of this phase is whether, when, and how adjudication be-
comes a useful tool to promote respect for the law. Exam-
ining compliance may require that scholars recognize that
the preferences of governments and other powerful actors
are not always the only, or even the primary, factors shap-
ing compliance politics and compliance decisions. 13 Study-
ing compliance politics helps to explain why judicialization
shifts power away from executives and why political leaders
respond to adjudication by making arguments and policy
decisions that can have unintended or unanticipated conse-
quences.
Several articles in this Thematic Section speak to state
compliance. For Staton and Romero (2019), noncompli-
ance with a judicial ruling is not necessarily a sign that a
court—in their case, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights—is weak; rather, it reflects a need in the adjudica-
tion phase to reduce the clarity of legal rulings in the face
of political uncertainty surrounding how to effect policy
change. Similarly, for Pelc and Busch (2019), one reason
that WTO rulings are often laden with affective language
is to strategically provide governments a resource to mo-
bilize pro-compliance interest groups around those rulings
where compliance is likely to be a political struggle. The
trade-off for doing so is that such language may encour-
age compliance in a specific case but reduce the case’s ap-
plicability beyond the dispute at hand. Lupu, Verdier, and
Versteeg (2019) seek to explain how national variation in
how judges apply international law also affects compliance
with human rights. Trying to deter backlash politics in the
feedback phase of judicialization, national judges act strate-
gically in the adjudication phase to shape the degree of com-
pliance.
The study of compliance per se has been strongly and
justifiably critiqued (Checkel 1999; Börzel 2001; Howse
and Teitel 2010; Martin 2013). Yet, respect for legal rul-
ings still matters. New questions about compliance pol-
itics are arising as governments seek to limit judicial
interference in their agendas. For example, the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has issued judg-
ments against European governments that assisted the
United States in detaining suspected terrorists at “black
sites” and rendering them to third countries (BBC 2018),
and the ICC prosecutor opened an investigation that in-
cluded similar allegations as well as potential war crimes in
Afghanistan(Moorehead and Whiting 2018). These rulings
may complicate any attempt by the Trump Administration to
12Hathaway and Shapiro discuss a range of social sanctions that are used as
part of “outcasting” to signify often less formal means to pressure for compliance
(Hathaway and Shapiro 2011). See also Harlow and Rawlings (1992).
13This idea is further developed in Alter et al. (2018), which focuses on how
contextual factors beyond the control of judges and governments affect IC au-
thority, influence, and power.
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revive “enhanced interrogations.” International courts are
also being asked to weigh in on government restructuring of
national judiciaries. The CJEU recently ruled that national
judges can block extradition requests to Poland due to
concerns that criminal trials in that country are unfair, and
the EU Commission launched an infringement action to
protect the independence of the Polish Supreme Court,
which has been threatened by executive interference(Court
of Justice of the European Union 2018). These examples re-
veal how judicial rulings, by providing future litigants with
validated legal claims and by facilitating external sanctions,
provide signals intended to deter future noncompliance.
Feedback politics—the strategies and actions that follow
from a legal victory or loss—reflect the fact that adjudica-
tion generates a precedent that can create a new political
status quo. There are two forms of feedback politics. Positive
feedback seeks to amplify a legal ruling applicable only to the
parties into a larger policy change or to new legal obligation
that is owed to all.14 Backlash politics tries to overturn a prece-
dent, abrogate or circumvent a ruling, or avert future losses
in similar cases.15 Although contestations over compliance
may take months or even years to play out, feedback poli-
tics can take even longer, becoming fully evident only when
publics inculcate a legal ruling, new actors enter the polit-
ical arena, or legal entrepreneurs attempt to broaden the
impact of a precedent.
An example of feedback politics that includes both pos-
itive and backlash elements is the landmark 1980 decision
of the US court of appeals in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala.16 That
ruling included two provocative findings. First, the court
revived a seemingly dead letter of American law, the Alien
Tort Statute, to adjudicate human rights claims by foreign-
ers. Second, the court held that the ban on torture was part
of customary international law. The case laid the ground-
work for the Torture Victim Protection Act, a 1991 statute
that codifies the right to sue foreign officials who torture
foreigners or US citizens and extends Filártiga to extrajudi-
cial killings.17 The revival of the Alien Tort Statute triggered
dozens of lawsuits against states, corporations, and private
individuals. These rulings also engendered backlash effects,
leading the US Supreme Court to sharply limit the statute
in recent years and shield these actors from liability(Samp
2018). As a result, the right for torture victims to sue for
damages is now entrenched in US law, yet the extension of
these rights vis-à-vis corporations has been curtailed.
Positive feedback and backlash effects may arise during
other phases of judicialization, regardless of whether a com-
plaint results in a final legal ruling. For example, bargaining
in the shadow of adjudication may lead to out-of-court settle-
ments that enhance respect for the law or, alternatively, cre-
ate new policies that eliminate the ability to file complaints.
Adjudication politics may spread a single legal victory across
a class of similarly situated actors or engender new com-
plaints that elicit more expansive legal rulings. Conversely,
such follow-on processes may lead adjudicators to nar-
row prior findings, limit remedies, or discourage future
litigation.
14Lawyers label this as an erga omnes effect. For a study of the erga omnes effects
of international court rulings, see Helfer and Voeten (2014).
15 In the IO legalization volume, Alter (2000) considers both forms of feed-
back effects. For literature on backlash, see Helfer (2002); Alter, Gathii, and
Helfer (2016); Madsen, Cebulak, and Wiebush (2018).
16Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
17Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73
(1992). The Act also adds detail, including statutes of limitations and exhaustion
of domestic remedies, that constrain post-Filártiga adjudication. See Apostolova
(2010).
In this Thematic Section, Lupu, Verdier, and Versteeg
(2019) theorize about how judges seek in the adjudication
phase to strategically avoid backlash. Ginsburg and Abebe
(2019) consider whether the expansion of judicialized pol-
itics in the 1990s later contributed to dejudicialization—a
term they define as extreme instances of backlash in which
states remove areas of law from external judicial review.
Building on the domestic judicial politics literature and liter-
ature on backlash against international courts (see footnote
15), Ginsburg and Abebe offer a conceptual framework for
thinking about how dejudicialization occurs.
Politics between and across the Four Phases
International relations is a famously state-centric discipline.
Studying the individual phases of judicialization sheds light
on several understudied issues—how nonstate actors as well
as states deploy international legal claims to bargain out
of court, how adjudicators rule, and whether and how the
parties comply with or resist new legal interpretations that
international adjudication generates. While venues, actors,
and politics at each phase differ, actors may attempt to build
connections across the phases to achieve their goals. Since
cases can settle at any time, there is no necessary progres-
sion from one phase to the next. But there are interactive
effects based on expectations of events later in the process
(Alter 2014, 59–60).
Viewed collectively, the contributions to this Thematic
Section highlights a more basic point: decisions at any point in
the adjudication process—from delegation, to the choice of whether
to sue, and how, if at all, to comply with a ruling—can have effects
that are neither direct nor immediate nor fully under the control
of governments. Adjudication can shift the meaning of legal
rules, providing a mode of policy and institutional change
that may be easier to orchestrate because it does not require
multilateral agreement.18 Legal rights-claiming and partic-
ipation in adjudication can also deepen political commit-
ments and lead to more fundamental changes in how actors
conceive of their rights and interests (Goodman, Jinks, and
Woods 2012; Goodman and Jinks 2013).19
Transnational litigation of LGBT rights illustrates this
point. The last two decades have seen numerous domes-
tic and international court rulings decriminalizing same-
sex relations and requiring governments to recognize same-
sex marriages. In addition to changing national policies
in individual countries, the shadow of adjudication has
shaped transborder strategies to promote LGBT rights.
Helfer and Voeten (2014) document the effect of ECtHR
rulings on LGBT rights in countries across Europe, includ-
ing those whose laws were not subject to judicial challenge.
LGBT advocacy is spreading to other regions. A 2018 Inter-
American Court of Human Rights advisory opinion on gen-
der identity and same-sex marriage is already being imple-
mented by national judges in Latin America(Contesse 2018;
Thapa, Saurav Jung 2018), and a groundbreaking unani-
mous judgment of the Supreme Court of India cites to ear-
lier pro-LGBT rulings to invalidate the country’s colonial-
era sodomy law, emboldening litigants to challenge similar
laws across Asia and Africa(Suri 2018).
These examples of politics inspired or shaped by adju-
dication highlight how judicialization makes law a distinct
kind of norm (Keohane 1997; Finnemore 1999). Knowing
18Reinterpretation is one of the modes of institutional change identified in
the historical institutionalist scholarship (Streeck and Thelen 2005).
19The literature on victim participation in mass atrocities prosecution also
proceeds from this premise. See Hoven and Scheibel (2015).
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more about the influence of these processes and nonstate
actors, as well as how adjudicators navigate the discretion
available to them, can help to better understand how ju-
dicialized outcomes differ from political bargains not re-
fracted through the legal process. For example, does par-
ticipation in legal rights-claiming and adjudication, and the
results it generates, influence how state and nonstate actors
frame and articulate preferences both inside and outside
of court? When is framing a state action as a violation of
international law (e.g., as a war crime or a human rights
abuse) helpful and when is this framing counterproduc-
tive (Cloward 2014; Helfer and Showalter 2017)? Answer-
ing such questions may also contribute to scholarship on
the spread of norms, knowledge, and ideas through legal
processes, as well as to emerging behavioral studies that ex-
amine how the personal traits of individual political leaders,
officials, and judges shape international relations (Hafner-
Burton et al. 2017).
When Judicialized Politics Matter
This Thematic Section uses a range of methodologies
to investigate the processes and effects of judicializing
international politics. In the past, states relied on their
own assessments of what actions international law requires.
These assessments tended to be shaped by each govern-
ment’s material, political, and strategic interests, leading
to self-serving interpretations that privileged national
sovereignty. In contrast, where international politics is
judicialized, litigation and litigation threats become tools
of influence. Political leaders must factor in (1) how adju-
dicators may rule and (2) the material and legitimacy costs
should their policies be found illegal.
The relevance of judicialization to international relations
stems from its potential to empower new actors, to shift po-
litical disputes into legal venues, and to generate discur-
sive and extralegal strategies to influence legal processes,
and thereby to affect outcomes of high political salience—
such as armed conflicts, territorial disputes, trade and in-
vestment, human rights, and societal well-being and devel-
opment. Such influence does not require litigants to pass
through all phases of judicialization or any particular phase,
such as compliance with a legal ruling. To the contrary, it is
possible for international relations to become judicialized in
a meaningful way—that is, for adjudicatory bodies to change
politics and outcomes in ways that shift away from the pref-
erences of states and their officials—at any phase. However,
judicialization is not necessarily limited to particular issue
areas, although it is more prevalent and more advanced in
some policy spaces than others.
The importance of judicialization for international re-
lations is a matter of degree. The phenomenon becomes
potentially important when any phase of the process
contributes to a shift in political dialogue, processes, or
outcomes over which governments once had exclusive or
primary control. Judicialization becomes increasingly polit-
ically salient as greater numbers and types of actors enter
into the process at different phases, increasing legal rights-
claiming and pressure for policy reforms—as has occurred,
for example, when women successfully pressed for the pros-
ecution of rape during wartime (Askin 2003) and for the
investigation of mass rape by police(Ahmed 2018). It takes
on greater importance when states or other powerful actors
respond to rulings by paying compensation or providing
other remedies. And it is most consequential when these
actors adopt long-term changes on “matters of outright and
utmost political significance that often define and divide
whole polities” (Hirschl 2008, 94)—such as Brexit and the
Colombian government’s peace agreement with the FARC.
We stress, however, that judicialization is not a one-way
phenomenon. To the contrary, politics can become deju-
dicialized. In this Thematic Section, Ginsburg and Abebe
(2019) focus on when states remove adjudicatory bodies
from the political equation, but politics can also become
dejudicialized when adjudicators lose their independence
(Brinks and Blass 2017) and, more generally, when “le-
gality” becomes less normatively or politically salient, lead-
ing governments to worry less about flouting law or legal
rulings (Dyzenhaus 2012; Brunnée and Toope 2017; Alter
2019). Meanwhile, dejudicialization may occur alongside
rejudicialization. For example, several developing countries
have recently withdrawn from treaties that allow foreign
corporations to seek international arbitration to challenge
domestic policies as violating international investment law
(Peinhardt and Wellhausen 2016). But this trend has also
contributed to new judicialization proposals, including the
European Union’s push to create a Multilateral Investment
Court (Council of the European Union 2018)20 and China’s
Belt and Road Initiative to create new judicial mechanisms
for adjudicating commercial disputes relating to Chinese
investments (Hillman and Goodman 2018; Cohen 2018).
Similarly, frustration by African political leaders with the In-
ternational Criminal Court has generated exit threats and
actual withdrawals from the Rome Statute, but it has also
led to the Malabo Protocol, which will create a criminal law
chamber for the proposed African Court of Justice and Hu-
man Rights, and it may spur national judges to launch their
own war crimes prosecutions (Sirleaf 2017).
Conclusion
The advent of judicialization beyond national borders marks
a fundamental shift in international relations. Whereas in
the past foreign ministries may have decided whether and
how to advance the legal claims of their nationals, today
firms, citizens, and countries are increasingly turning di-
rectly to adjudicatory bodies in the hopes of eliciting a legal
ruling that vindicates their position. Although some have ar-
gued that this shift is permanent, recent events reveal that
some governments have responded by mobilizing political
resources and strategies to defend their interests. In addi-
tion, populist revolts against European integration and glob-
alization more generally may have been exacerbated by the
strength of the courts associated with the EU and the WTO
and the international arbitral tribunals that hear investor-
state disputes by foreign corporations.
These politics may take a long time to fully play out, so
that the ultimate impact of international adjudication may
not be immediately apparent. For example, China’s entry
into the WTO and its acceptance of the obligation to ad-
judicate trade disputes has had many downstream politi-
cal effects. The United States no longer uses the threat
of withdrawing most favored nation market access because
China disrespects the human rights of its citizens. The bind-
ing and legally enforceable nature of WTO trade rules
has constrained responses to increased Chinese imports,
contributing to the US and European strategy of negoti-
ating new trade agreements outside of the WTO frame-
work (Dür and Elsig 2015), to the invocation of national
security as a justification for limiting imports, to the cur-
rent US policy of blocking appointments to the WTO
20See Multilateral Investment Court: Council gives mandate to the Commis-
sion to open negotiations.
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Appellate Body (Shaffer, Elsig, and Pollack 2017), and to
a populist backlash against trade liberalization. Most re-
cently, the United States announced its withdrawal from a
144-year-old postal union treaty, because this treaty provides
discounted small package shipping rates for Chinese goods
sent to the United States(Thrush 2018). The WTO also cre-
ates a potential platform for China to take up the mantle of
multilateralism that the Trump administration is shedding.
These events are not wholly determined by the judicializa-
tion processes we discuss. Yet, it is nonetheless the case that
the legal rights and obligations associated with China’s WTO
membership—and the fact that these rights can be judicially
enforced—have been a global political game changer.
The overarching insights of the judicialization
framework—that states do not fully determine the content,
scope, or impact of delegation or adjudication and that legal process
can diminish the role of executives and legislatures—has impor-
tant implications for the study of international relations. A
key implication is that some of what the law actually does
takes place in the shadows. The mere threat of adjudication
can prompt mobilization, bargains, and negotiations in
ways that shape political decisions without any formal legal
actions—a fact that has gone largely unnoticed by tradi-
tional international relations theory, which tends to focus
on actual disputes and their settlements. This Thematic
Section thus opens up a whole new range for the study of
legal influence.
Moreover, the adjudication process itself, once it has
kicked in, brings a range of new actors that have not tra-
ditionally been the focus of international relations theo-
rists. Alongside states and their well-studied branches of
government are many other actors, such as judges and ar-
bitrators, that interject themselves into what traditionally
have been considered state matters. Thus, for debates over
compliance, looking simply to immediate state-driven out-
comes may miss an essential element of law’s influence. Le-
gal scholars have long understood that law is a process; in-
terjecting this insight into the study of international politics
can—and should—change the way we study what legal in-
stitutions actually do and how they help or hinder different
actors and actions.
Adjudication—and its very possibility—shapes legal dis-
course and state and international decision-making. More
broadly, the “practice of legality” imparts a stability and a
universality to international law that, at least in some cir-
cumstances, limits the extent to which the whims of execu-
tives are accepted within a single society or diffused around
the world (Brunnée and Toope 2018). The constraints of
this stability may be limited, as, for example, when President
Trump follows prescribed legal steps to execute decisions
to withdraw from international agreements or to levy tar-
iffs, thereby avoiding litigation over alleged abuses of presi-
dential authority (Nexon and Cooley, forthcoming). Yet, the
“stickiness” of legal processes may also mean that, in the
long run, Trump will fail to change the international institu-
tions or laws he dislikes, avoiding a major disruption of the
existing multilateral order.21
We do not dispute that power undergirds laws and legal
practices, such as those concerning the use of force and
the pursuit of vital national interests.22 But the interests
21Koh (2018) argues that transnational legal process leaves the laws and in-
stitutions in place, so that Trump is, in effect, “resigning without leaving” (chap.
3).
22A forthcoming special issue of Security Studies, “Hegemony Studies 3.0: The
Dynamics of Hegemonic Orders,” examines how hegemons shape and are con-
strained by the orders they construct and by the resistance these orders generate.
of great powers cannot explain all externally oriented
national and international behaviors. It cannot explain why
international laws do not maximally advantage hegemonic
interests, why human rights advocacy has developed specific
understandings of legal rights-claiming, why firms and
bankers worry about and respond to legal regulations,
or why national judges decide cases by applying settled
principles of legal interpretation that ignore guidance from
political actors.
This does not mean that state interests no longer matter;
indeed, the more powerful a state is, the better it may be
able to deflect legal processes or harness law as another tool
in its arsenal (Kittrie 2016). But it does mean that state inter-
ests may be shaped, limited, and channeled by adjudicatory
bodies and nonstate actors in ways not yet fully understood.
This Thematic Section sets the stage for future research by
theorizing the concept of judicialization as broader than ad-
judication by international courts and as beyond the con-
trol of executives and legislatures and by introducing some
of the mechanisms and modalities by which judicialization
can shift power away from states in ways that may—or may
not—be reversible.
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